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Green Propellant Loading Demonstration at U.S. Range  
Henry W. Mulkey1, Joseph T. Miller2 and Caitlin E. Bacha3 
NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, Md, 20771 
The Green Propellant Loading Demonstration (GPLD) was conducted December 2015 at 
Wallops Flight Facility (WFF), leveraging work performed over recent years to bring lower 
toxicity hydrazine replacement green propellants to flight missions. The objective of this 
collaboration between NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), WFF, the Swedish 
National Space Board (SNSB), and Ecological Advanced Propulsion Systems (ECAPS) was 
to successfully accept LMP-103S propellant at a U.S. Range, store the propellant, and 
perform a simulated flight vehicle propellant loading. NASA GSFC Propulsion (Code 597) 
managed all aspects of the operation, handling logistics, preparing the procedures, and 
implementing the demonstration. In addition to the partnership described above, Moog Inc. 
developed an LMP-103S propellant-compatible titanium rolling diaphragm flight 
development tank and loaned it to GSFC to act as the GPLD flight vessel. The flight 
development tank offered the GPLD an additional level of flight-like propellant handling 
process and procedures. Moog Inc. also provided a compatible latching isolation valve for 
remote propellant expulsion. The GPLD operation, in concert with Moog Inc. executed a 
flight development tank expulsion efficiency performance test using LMP-103S propellant. 
As part of the demonstration work, GSFC and WFF documented Range safety analyses and 
practices including all elements of shipping, storage, handling, operations, decontamination, 
and disposal. LMP-103S has not been previously handled at a U.S. Launch Range. Requisite 
for this activity was an LMP-103S Risk Analysis Report and Ground Safety Plan. GSFC and 
WFF safety offices jointly developed safety documentation for application into the GPLD 
operation. The GPLD along with the GSFC Propulsion historical hydrazine loading 
experiences offer direct comparison between handling green propellant versus safety 
intensive, highly toxic hydrazine propellant. These described motives initiated the GPLD 
operation in order to investigate the handling and process safety variances in project 
resources between LMP-103S and typical in-space propellants. The GPLD risk reduction 
operation proved successful for many reasons including handling the green propellant at a 
U.S. Range, loading and pressurizing a flight-like tank, expelling the propellant, measuring 
the tank expulsion efficiency, and most significantly, GSFC propulsion personnel’s new 
insight into the LMP-103S propellant handling details. 
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Nomenclature 
ADN  =  Ammonium Dinitramide  
ASME  =  American Society of Mechanical 
   Engineers  
BB-1  = Blowback Valve  
CC  = Catch Container  
CE  = European Conformity  
CSG  = Centre Spatial Guyanais 
DAQ  = Data Acquisition  
DI  = De-Ionized  
DIAB  = DAQ-in-a-Box  
DVT  = Design Verification Tank  
ECAPS  = Ecological Advanced Propulsion 
Systems  
EPV  = Expulsion Valve  
ESA  = European Space Agency  
ESD  = Electric Static Discharge  
FC  = Fuel Cart  
FDT  = Flight Development Tank  
FDV  = Fill and Drain Valve  
FVV  = Fill and Vent Valve 
GAS  = Get Away Special 
GHe  = Gaseous Helium 
GOWG  = Ground Operation Working Group  
GPLD   = Green Propellant Loading 
Demonstration 
GPLE  = Green Propellant Loading 
Equipment   
GPM  = Global Precipitation Measurement  
GSP  =  Ground Safety Plan  
GSFC  = Goddard Space Flight Center 
HPGP  = High Performance Green  
   Propulsion 
IA  = Implementing Arrangement  
IPA  = Isopropyl Alcohol 
IRAD  = Internal Research and Development  
MEOP  = Maximum Expected Operating 
Pressure  
MOP  = Maximum Operating Pressure  
MMS  = Magnetospheric MultiScale 
NASA  = National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration 
PACE  = Plankton, Aerosols, Clouds and 
ocean Ecosystems  
PAPR  = Powered Air Purifying Respirator  
PPE  = Personal Protective Ensemble  
PRISMA  = Prototype Research Instruments 
and Space Mission technology 
Advancement 
PVS  = Pressure Vessel Systems  
RAR  = Risk Analysis Report  
SBIR  = Small Business Innovative 
Research 
SCAPE  = Self Contained Atmospheric 
Protective Ensemble  
SDS  = Safety Data Sheet  
SHAR  = Sriharikota High Altitude Range 
SNSB  = Swedish National Space Board  
STMD  = Space Technology Mission 
Directorate 
TC  = Transport Container  
TRR  = Test Readiness Review  
TT  = Transfer Tank  
TTA  = Transfer Tank Assembly  
VAFB  = Vandenberg Air Force Base  
VI  = Virtual Instrument  
WFF  = Wallops Flight Facility 
WFIRST  = Wide Field Infrared Survey 
Telescope  
I. Introduction 
reen propulsion offers numerous benefits to NASA missions, ranging from increasing propulsion system 
performance to decreasing spacecraft processing hazards, schedule, and cost1,2. Technology maturation funded 
through the Space Technology Mission Directorate (STMD), the Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) 
Program, and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) field center’s internal research and 
development efforts over the past several years continues to demonstrate NASA’s interest in hydrazine-alternative 
green propulsion technologies. Recognizing a mutual interest in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful 
purposes, NASA and the Swedish National Space Board (SNSB) outlined a collaboration contained in an 
Implementing Arrangement (IA) in which the agencies collaborate to perform initial testing for spacecraft 
applications of High Performance Green Propulsion (HPGP) technologies. Signed in September 2013, NASA 
initiated the IA with the SNSB to work synergistically on HPGP technologies and mission infusion potential. 
ECological Advanced Propulsion Systems (ECAPS) HPGP technology employs the Swedish-developed LMP-103S, 
an ammonium dinitramide (ADN), water, methanol, and ammonia propellant blend, which has demonstrated >6% 
higher specific impulse and >30% higher density impulse over hydrazine3. The IA supports three principal 
activities4: 1-lbf (5 N) and 5-lbf (22 N) thruster development and life tests, tank fracture mechanics testing to 
determine pressurized propellant tank safe design life5,6, and a U.S. Range propellant loading demonstration. 
Thruster and tank fracture mechanics testing are scheduled to be completed in 2017. This paper focuses on the 
results and lessons learned from the propellant loading demonstration effort conducted at the U.S. Launch Range, 
NASA Wallops Flight Facility (WFF). 
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In 2010, the Prototype Research Instruments and Space Mission technology Advancement (PRISMA) launched 
from Yasny Launch facility in Russia. This mission was the first in-space green propellant demonstration employing 
two 0.2-lbf (1 N) HPGP thrusters and carrying a 12.1 lb (5.5 kg) LMP-103S propellant load. In addition to the 
HPGP system, PRISMA also utilized a monopropellant hydrazine propulsion system with six 0.2-lbf (1 N) 
thrusters7. This approach allowed direct comparison of on-orbit thruster and propulsion system performance and 
spacecraft processing. By conducting concurrent hydrazine and LMP-103S PRISMA spacecraft loading operations, 
ECAPS differentiated propellant commodity payload processing schedule and cost. The PRISMA mission realized 
greater than two-third savings in overall schedule and total cost with the HPGP propellant load versus the hydrazine 
equivalent8. From this initial work, NASA has formulated potential reductions in future science mission payload 
processing employing HPGP systems. There are discernable differences between launching from Yasny and U.S. 
Ranges; in addition, the various U.S. Ranges express different concerns regarding spacecraft processing safety and 
risk evaluation. Accordingly, the LMP-103S propellant loading demonstration was intended for U.S. Range 
approval of LMP-103S propellant and to further realize the gains related to the ease of handling. In support of 
Google’s Terra Bella SkySat spacecraft constellation9, ECAPS will be performing LMP-103S propellant loading 
operations at three launch Ranges in 2016-2017: The first HPGP propellant load operation was conducted June 2016 
at Sriharikota High Altitude Range (SHAR), India, four HPGP propellant load operations at Centre Spatial Guyanais 
(CSG), French Guiana and six HPGP propellant load operations at Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB), California 
U.S.A. With the inclusion of Yasney and WFF, over this year and the following, LMP-103S propellant will have 
been handled at five launch Ranges on three different continents10. This outcome results in four major Range Safety 
organizations (U.S., European, Indian, and Russian) gaining familiarity with LMP-103S propellant loading 
operations and the associated benefits. 
II. GPLD Objective and Overview  
The Green Propellant Loading Demonstration (GPLD) at U.S. Range was a pathfinder activity for missions 
desiring the increased performance and ease of handling benefits associated with green propellants. Funded through 
the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) Internal Research and Development (IRAD) program, the GPLD operation 
was successfully conducted December 2015 at WFF demonstrating the reduction in effort over an equivalent 
hydrazine load. The objective of this collaboration between GSFC, WFF, the SNSB, and ECAPS was to 
successfully accept LMP-103S propellant at a U.S. Range, store the propellant, and perform a simulated flight 
vehicle propellant loading. The GPLD program collaboration is shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: GPLD Collaboration  
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GPLD had complex programmatic and logistical requirements. In addition, due to staff constraints caused by 
other space flight commitments (dashed blue line, Figure 2), GPLD was unable to begin in earnest until March 2015, 
compressing the overall GPLD schedule. As detailed in Figure 2, GPLD was able to successfully demonstrate LMP-
103S propellant transport, storage, and handling, including all procedure development and safety negotiation, within 
nine months (April – December 2015). The operation was low-cost and conducted on an abbreviated timeframe. A 
total of five Ground Operation Working Groups (GOWGs) were conducted between GSFC and WFF, to present the 
GPLD status, initiate discussions, and work actions. The Moog Inc. Flight Development Tank (FDT) was qualified 
to a tailored version of AIAA S-08011 for use in the GPLD operation at WFF. This involved weekly discussions 
between Moog Inc. and GSFC to ensure that the FDT was on schedule and meeting GPLD operation-required 
milestones, as well as communicating test and results to WFF Range Safety. ECAPS provided GSFC LMP-103S 
propellant and loaned GSFC the use of their Fuel Cart (FC) for the GPLD operation. Use of the ECAPS FC required 
coordination with WFF on FC pressure vessel and loading equipment certification. Due to the LMP-103S 
propellant’s novelty and Range unfamiliarity, logistics for receiving and handling the propellant proved challenging; 
however, Range acceptance documents were created to define the requirements for facility, ground support 
equipment, and personal protective equipment (PPE).  
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Figure 2: GPLD Planning and Implementation Timeline  
III. GPLD Operations  
The GPLD operation was structured to imitate a flight vehicle propellant loading. Figure 3 details the GPLD 
operational flow. The loading and decontamination operations and subsequent procedures were developed from 
combined NASA GSFC historical hydrazine and ECAPS LMP-103S propellant handling experiences. The GPLD 
primarily was structured after the PRISMA spacecraft propellant loading operation. One notable difference was that 
GPLD required two LMP-103S open container operations, as opposed to one, and included a FDT tank expulsion 
test. GSFC propulsion personnel have recently loaded hydrazine propellant for the Global Precipitation 
Measurement (GPM) and the Magentospheric MultiScale (MMS) four observatory constellation missions. GPM’s 
hydrazine load was 1,202 lb (545 kg) and MMS loaded a total of 3,630 lb (1,646 kg). Each of these loading 
experiences provided framework and were consolidated to develop the GPLD operational plan and procedures. The 
GPLD, alongside GSFC Propulsion historical hydrazine loading experiences, provided direct comparison between 
handling green versus hydrazine propellant. These described motives initiated the GPLD operation, in order to 
investigate the process safety variances in project resources between LMP-103S and typical in-space propellants.  
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Figure 3: GPLD Operations Plan  
A. Loading Facility  
The GPLD operation was conducted at the WFF   
W-65 Bay 2 launch support vehicle assembly 
processing facility. W-65 Bay 2 is a large high bay, 
34’ wide x 65’ long x 21’ tall (10 x 19 x 6.4 m) 
relating to a volume of 46,410 ft3 (1,314 m3). The 
facility has temperature control within a 45 – 90°F 
(7.2 – 32.2°C) and humidity control of 30% – 70%. 
The facility does not contain a fire suppression 
system; however, WFF Launch Range has an on-site 
fire station. The facility has lightning protection and 
warning systems. The W-65 facility has a 5,000 lb 
(2,268 kg) 1.1 explosive class handling capability 
and 300,000 lb (136,078 kg) 1.3 explosive class. If 
mixed 1.1 and 1.3 explosives are present and to be 
handled, then the lower handling capacity of 
5,000 lb is the limit.  
The WFF Range and Explosive Safety Officer 
classified the GPLD operation and LMP-103S 
(when out of transport packaging) as 1.3C in 
accordance with NASA-STD-8719.1212. The sum 
total of LMP-103S propellant handled was 27 lb 
(12.4 kg) provided in two 1.32 gal (5 L) transport containers. 
B. Loading Equipment  
 The GPLD required ground support equipment to complete pressure and vacuum integrity testing, LMP-103S 
propellant transfer from shipping container to a propellant loading source container, propellant transfer to the FDT 
and pressurization, FDT propellant expulsion, and decontamination. Pressure and propellant transfer operations are 
inherent to propellant loading operations; however, the GPLD exhibited one additional element, the FDT expulsion 
test and requisite LMP-103S propellant collection. Figure 5 displays the Green Propellant Loading Equipment 
(GPLE). Figures 6a and 6b show the ECAPS FC and the GPLD Transfer Tank (TT) processing area in the WFF   
W-65 Bay 2 facility.  
 The FC, provided by ECAPS enabled all pressurization and evacuation operations; the FC contains a high 
pressure supply capability rated at 1000 psia (69 bar), a low pressure branch rated at 29 psia (2 bar), and a vacuum 
system section. Each pressurization and evacuation section has integrated venting allowing the media to exit the cart 
at one location. The FC is fabricated of commercially available pressure regulators, valves, digital and analog 
pressure gauges all utilizing CRES wetted materials and connections. The fittings and tubing connecting these FC 
components were similarly CRES materials. 
 
Figure 4: WFF W-65 Facility 
 American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
 
6 
Fuel 
Cart 
(FC) 
Transfer 
Tank (TT) 
Transfer 
Tank 
Assembly  
(TTA) Scale 
Flight Development 
Tank (FDT)
FDT 
Scale 
Blast
Shield 
Blast  Shield Supports
Eye Wash 
Spill Kit
 
Figure 5: Green Propellant Loading Equipment (GPLE) Staged Overview – WFF W-65 Bay 2 Facility 
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Figure 6: a) ECAPS Fuel Cart (FC)        b) GPLD Transfer Tank (TT) Processing Area 
 An ASME stamped 3 gal (11.35 L) 304L stainless steel vessel was used as the propellant loading source 
container, designated the TT. This 205 psig (14.1 bar) pressure rated vessel offered three port connections and one 
dedicated outlet with a dip tube assembly and an enclosure lid enabling a moderate level of vacuum capability. The 
TT was fitted with a valve and tube assembly manifold allowing FC low pressure and vacuum/vent pathways, and a 
propellant fill port utilized for loading the propellant from the shipping Transport Container (TC) to the TT. In 
addition, this valve assembly allowed pressurant or propellant media flow paths from the TT to the FDT tank. A 
compound analog pressure gauge and a Pressure Vessel Systems (PVS) required popping relief valve were installed 
on the remaining two TT ports. A clean, empty and identical 1.32 gal (5 L) propellant TC with a filter and dip tube 
cap assembly was employed as an intermediary for cap replacement of a full LMP-103S propellant container. This 
open container operation was required in order to place the filter and dip tube assembly into the full propellant TC 
for the propellant transfer into the TT using a peristaltic pump.  
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The TT was positioned on a transfer tank assembly (TTA) digital scale (0-110.2 lb (0-50 kg)) used to track the 
propellant mass leaving the TT and entering the FDT. Due to the LMP-103S propellant pump tubing connection to 
the TT and the potential for small drips, the TT was placed in a stainless steel catch tray. Additionally, there were 3x 
load cells (0-50 lb (0 - 22.7 kg)) located 120° apart on the FDT dolly to measure the propellant mass loaded into the 
FDT. As a tertiary means of mass monitoring, the FDT turnover dolly was positioned on a larger footprint digital 
scale (5,511.5 lb (0-2,500 kg)). The mass of propellant loaded into the FDT and the mass of propellant off-loaded 
from the TT was monitored via these three measurements. The TTA digital scale tracked the official mass of 
propellant loaded into the FDT.  
As pictured in Figure 7, the GPLD FDT was developed by Moog, Inc. and is a rolling diaphragm13 tank with a 
400 psig (27.6 bar) Maximum Expected Operating Pressure (MEOP). For the GPLD operation the Maximum 
Operating Pressure (MOP) was designated 335 psig (23.1 bar), as governed by the 350 psia (24.1 bar) HPGP 
thrusters inlet maximum pressure14. The diaphragm and all components of the tank are manufactured from 
commercially pure titanium. The tank features an all welded construction of a metallic diaphragm to the tank shell. 
The pressurant and propellant volumes are separated by the diaphragm. The tank liquid volume is 390 in3 (~6.4 L) 
with a pressurant volume of 190 in3 (~3.1 L). Since this tank was only used for ground demonstration, the FDT was 
qualified to a tailored version of the AIAA S-080. Moog Inc. manufactured an acceptance FDT that was used for the 
GPLD operation and a Design Verification Tank (DVT) that was qualified and eventually burst. The Moog, Inc. 
tank for GPLD operations was considered pseudo flight hardware and was only approved by WFF Range safety for 
the GPLD ground use operation. For this tank design to be considered fully flight qualified, it will need to be 
reassessed against AIAA-S080, or the governing Range Safety manual. Tank fracture mechanics safe life testing and 
crack growth analysis are still necessary to satisfy U.S. Range requirements.   
A Space Shuttle Get Away Special (GAS) payload dolly was brought to GSFC for refurbishment to serve as the 
FDT tank turnover dolly. As illustrated in Figure 7, a specialized cage fixture was fabricated to allow tank mounting 
into the dolly. The fixture also allowed the tank and propellant load to balance, disturbance free, on the three load 
cells as shown in more detail in Figure 7a. An FDT surrogate was 3D printed in order to manufacture the tank 
fixture and dolly before the tank arrived. Figure 7b exhibits the GPLD FDT tank assembly build up before final 
pressure and propellant inflow and outflow flex line connections hookup.  
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Figure 7: a) FDT Dolly Installation        b) GPLD FDT Dolly Installation  
Figure 8 depicts the final FDT configuration. The FC gaseous pressurant flex line supply was connected to the 
top portion of the FDT with the Fill and Vent Valve (FVV) providing isolation. Local pressure measurement data 
from two pressure transducers and one digital pressure gauge were located on the FDT gas side. The high pressure 
gas FDT tank inlet FC supply extended to the propellant FDT compartment via the Blow Back valve (BB-1) 
isolation. This type of crossover enabled higher, > 29 psia (2 bar), pressure capability for integrity testing. The TT 
propellant flex line supply linked the FDT lower portion with the Fill and Drain Valve (FDV) providing isolation. 
This path allowed LMP-103S propellant to flow from the TT into the FDT propellant volume. During FDT 
expulsion, the LMP-103S propellant flowed out the FDT lower section into the Moog Inc. model 052-265 latch 
valve, labeled expulsion valve -1 (EPV-1), through a metering valve EPV-2 into a propellant catch container (CC). 
The LMP-103S propellant vapor exited the container and was vented from the CC directly to atmosphere through a 
small port in the Bay 2 rear wall.  
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The EPV-1 valve was connected to the FDT outlet tube fitting assembly and to the propellant outflow flex line, 
connected to the CC, using PTFE non-marring Swagelok front and back ferrules, stainless steel nuts, and lock 
wiring across the union. This operational arrangement required full pressurization to FDT MOP in order to verify 
connection integrity before propellant commodity introduction. In addition, due to the lack of Swagelok vendor 
pressure rating for the PTFE ferrules use, WFF PVS required GSFC propulsion to perform additional pressure 
testing to prove the connection safe use. To accomplish this, a cycling test was conducted to pressurize a small tube 
section to 1.25x MOP, then vented and evacuated, repeated five times. This test was repeated three times more than 
nominally would be conducted during the GPLD operation. A high pressure test was also performed to determine 
the PTFE ferrules and lock wire maximum hold pressure. This operation was identical to the cycling pressure test 
setup, but with fresh PTFE ferrules. The tube section was pressurized in incremental stages with five minute test 
periods in between. The lock wire broke and the PTFE ferrule slipped off the tube at nearly three minutes into the 
1200 psi (82 bar) pressure test. These two operations provided confidence into this connection arrangement. 
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Figure 8: a) FDT Expulsion and Catch Container       b) FDT Final Configuration  
C. Instrumentation  
As with other aspects of the GPLD project, data 
acquisition (DAQ) needed to be accomplished on budget 
and safely. To this end, a DAQ-in-a-Box (DIAB) shown 
in Figure 9 was fabricated. A medium sized Pelican case 
housed two NI-6212 differential voltmeters, one NI-9213 
thermocouple reader and one NI-6525 low-power relay 
control. Each of the devices communicated via USB to an 
attached PC running LabVIEW and a customized virtual 
instrument (VI) performing all of the data logging and 
calculations.  The NI devices were hardwired to circular 
connectors installed on an aluminum panel to enable 
quick and consistent connections to be made to the 
Omega load cells and Brooks pressure transducers.  The 
T-type thermocouples were attached via a thermocouple 
bulkhead mount with two-prong connectors. Also shown 
in Figure 9 is the EPV-1 latch valve fire box that was 
fabricated to enable remote actuation (open and closing) for FDT expulsion.  
The VI, shown in Figure 10, was developed using LabView 2013 over the course of several weeks and was 
designed to be “plug and play” while still allowing for the user to control various aspects to safely monitor the 
loading and depressurizing operations. Through several water load rehearsals, the VI was judged robust enough to 
not cause any hindrance during setup for, and execution of, the loading and expulsion operations. All hardware 
calibration data was taken from vendor specifications but verified against test data generated by the team during the 
run-up to the operations. 
 
Figure 9: DAQ-in-a-Box 
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Figure 10: GPLD Operation Virtual Instrument  
Data was captured by the DIAB during each of the major GPLD operations: leak checks, propellant loading, 
pressurization, expulsion, and the final vent. The data recorded was valuable despite receiving noisy load cell 
information. A slow sine curve was present in the collected load cell data as pictured in Figure 11. The noise was 
significantly reduced through the use of a moving average filter in post processing. This noise was a result of the 
small load cell output, on the order of 10 mV maximum, which was read by the NI-6212 running off unsteady 5V 
USB power provided over a long cable. In the future, both an RLC hardware filter and a more accurate, wall-
powered NI voltmeter module would be used to reduce noise.  
 
 
Figure 11: Load Cell Sum – FDT Propellant Load  
D. Rehearsal  
Two GPLD water loads rehearsals were conducted, with WFF Range Safety traveling to GSFC to participate in 
the second. The purpose of this activity was to demonstrate the GPLD loading procedure using a simulated FDT and 
the associated wetted GPLE. This team training exercise was based on the GPLD loading procedure. Using the 
GPLD loading procedure as the starting point, the most salient points were chosen and applied to work out 
potentially intricate concepts and methodologies. The water loading equipment was simplified to focus mainly on 
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the TC open container, TT liquid simulant loading and FDT loading operations using the GPLE TT. The FDT was 
simulated using a stainless steel container and likewise the TC used was a plastic container similar to the propellant 
shipping container. The mass of water loaded into the simulated FDT matched the FDT LMP-103S propellant load. 
The ECAPS provided FC was not available to use for the water loading operations. So a standard pressure panel and 
vacuum system equipment, historical to GSFC propulsion, were used. These two pieces of equipment provided the 
necessary functionality for rehearsal; however, it is best practice to prepare and rehearse with the intended propellant 
loading equipment when possible. All simulated waste, decontamination cleaning, and rinsate was collected in the 
CC, as identical for the GPLD operation at WFF. 
After the first rehearsal was completed the team de-briefed, documenting the items requiring attention and noting 
the procedural aspects that worked well. The same operational evaluation process was repeated after the second 
rehearsal. The water loading rehearsals and lessons learned were directly incorporated into the final GPLD loading 
procedure. Rehearsals such as these are standard operation for NASA GSFC propulsion loading operations. The 
same GSFC propulsion personnel performed the water load rehearsals and the GPLD to bolster team cohesion.  
E. Operations  
The GPLD activity at WFF was conducted over the course of eight days, divided into a three-day and five-day 
work session. Outlined in Table 1, Days 1-3 constitute the first work session, and Days 4-8 the second. The first 
work session included the GPLD Test Readiness Review (TRR), final GPLE pack up at GSFC and equipment 
transport to the WFF W-65 facility, travel to WFF, GPLE un-packing and staging, FDT installation into the turnover 
dolly, instrument buildup and end-to-end testing, and the GPLE finalized staging. The second work period began the 
propellant loading operation week. A WFF Range Safety briefing was conducted on the first day, directly followed 
by the FC un-packing, receiving and inspection, and leak testing. GSFC propulsion personnel performed a FC 
training exercise to establish familiarity with its function. This activity was required by WFF PVS and demonstrated 
the FC technician’s ability to pressurize the high and low pressure sections of the FC using the regulators and 
valves, operate the vacuum system and vent the gas. The remaining days were dedicated to GPLE final build up, 
high and low pressure integrity testing, TT propellant load operation, FDT MOP pressurization, FDT expulsion, 
decontamination, breakdown, and staging for transport back to GSFC.  
 
Table 1: GPLD Outline - Daily Operation 
Day 1 – Monday Day  2 - Tuesday Day  3 – Wednesday 
• GPLD – TRR 
• Final pack up for to 
GPLE transport to 
WFF 
• GPLD personnel travel to WFF 
• GPLE pickup and transport to WFF W-65 Bay 2 Facility 
• GPLD GSE Staging/Unpacking
• FDT installation into turnover dolly 
• Instrumentation buildup and checkout at WFF 
• Instrumentation end-to-end at WFF 
• Finalize W-65 Staging for GPLD operations 
• GPLD personnel return to GSFC 
Day  4 – Monday Day  5 - Tuesday Day  6 – Wednesday Day  7 – Thursday Day  8 – Friday 
• WFF Safety Briefing 
• Fuel Cart Un-Packing 
• Fuel Cart Receiving 
and Inspection 
• Fuel Cart Leak Test 
• FC Training 
Procedure 
• GPLE Final Build up 
• GPLE Dew Point 
Measurement 
• GPLE High Pressure 
Integrity Test 
• GPLE Low Pressure Integrity Test 
• Pump propellant into TT 
• Pressurize TT and push propellant 
into FDT 
• Purge back fill line 
• Pressurize FDT 
• Perform FDT 
Expulsion 
• Purge GPLE 
System
• Pop Back FDT
Diaphragm 
• TT Decontamination
• FDT Decontamination 
• Purge GPLE system 
• Breakdown and stage 
for transport to GSFC
 
 
1. Loading and Expulsion  
The GPLE operation to conduct the LMP-103S propellant transfer into the FDT and subsequent expulsion into 
the CC consisted of several items. As described earlier in section III B and depicted schematically in Figure 12, this 
equipment facilitated the GPLD operation. The pre-work performed in the first work session confirmed equipment 
had arrived from shipment and additionally that the facility provided the functionality to meet operational needs. 
This effort ultimately staged the W-65 Bay 2 facility for the GPLD. During this period, the turnover dolly was 
situated on the FDT digital scale, then after a FDT post shipment inspection, it was mounted into the turnover dolly. 
The FDT gas and propellant side valve manifolds were built up and cleaned as assemblies at GSFC prior to 
shipment. The manifolds were un-bagged and the gas and propellant manifolds were connected. The FDT load cell, 
pressure and temperature instrumentation sensors were positioned and harnessing was connected to the DIAB. The 
VI and data collection was then verified through an end-to-end checkout. The EPV-1 latch valve fire box 
commanding (open and closing) was also performed during the final checkout.  
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As part of the FC training procedure, a high pressure gaseous helium (GHe) k-bottle was connected to the FC 
pressure inlet and leak testing was performed at 550 psig (37.9 bar). Flex lines were then connected to the high and 
low pressure FC outlets and the vacuum vent inlet/outlet. The FC high pressure permitted a GHe flow path to both 
the FDT pressurant and propellant compartments. The FC low pressure and vacuum vent flex line were manifolded 
and connected directly to the TT. Flex lines were laid out and positioned close to their respective FDT inlets FVV, 
BB-1 and FDV. To verify the GPLE pressure connections dryness, a dew point measurement was taken at the end of 
each flex line, as well as through the TT. This is standard practice for propulsion system integration pressure testing 
and hydrazine loading operations, and through historical practice, was carried into the GPLD loading procedure. 
LMP-103S consists of 14% water and as such, lacks water sensitivities as with hydrazine propellant. After dryness 
verification through dew point, the final FC to FDT flex lines were joined. The FDT outlet to CC flex line was 
attached and additionally, the propellant vapor vent flex line attached and routed to the outside. All GHe and 
propellant vapors were exhausted to the local atmosphere directly outside Bay 2.  
After the GPLE was set-up, properly configured as illustrated in Figure 12, and all fitting connections tightened, 
pressure integrity testing was performed prior to conducting propellant loading, FDT pressurization, and expulsion. 
This three step test certified the GPLE for use. The first part was a pressure decay test at 350 psia (24.1 bar) of the 
GPLE connections up to FVV and FDV. The second part was a FDT MOP pressure decay test, specifically testing 
the open EPV-1 latch valve configuration PTFE ferrule and lock-wire connections at 350 psia (24.1 bar). Due to the 
requisite FDT diaphragm pressure differential limit, the FDT pressurant and propellant volumes were pressurized 
concurrently. Once the decay test time was complete, the EPV-1 latching valve was commanded closed, the 
downstream pressure vented using EPV-2 and the pressure decay test was repeated. Initially, the EPV-1 latch valve 
was open to test PTFE ferrule and lock wire connections and additionally the flex line connecting the FDT 
propellant outlet to the CC. Once this section was vented, the EPV-1 valve was tested to verify it could internally 
hold the 350 psia (24.1 bar) propellant pressure load before commanding open and expelling into the CC. The final 
pressure decay test was at low pressure, 21.8 psia (1.5 bar), from FC low pressure outlet through the TT up to the 
FDV. The GPLE environmental pressure gauges and FDT instrumentation was monitored and data collected during 
these integrity operations.  
 
 
 
SF2
SF3
FDV
FVV
TG-1
PT-2
EPV-2
EPV-1
 
 
FL-2
FL-3
FL-4
BB-1
FL-7
FL-6
FL-5
FL-8
SF1
PT-3
FL-7
FL-4 PT-4
 
PT-1
GAS
PROPELLANT
C-9
TTV-2
TTV-1
TTV-3
C-10 C-11
TTV-4
Transfer 
Tank
TTA Scale
TTV-G
TTV
-RV0
Transfer 
Tank 
Assembly 
( TTA)
FDT Scale
RV1
 
SF4
FL-6
Vent to 
Outside 
Catch 
Container
Fuel Cart 
High Pressure 
Low Pressure 
Vacuum/Vent 
 
Figure 12: GPLD Load Schematic  
The next process was to load the TT with propellant as depicted in Figure 13. This 18.1 lb (8.2 kg) TT load 
involved two LMP-103S open container operations. Just prior, two LMP-103S TCs were unboxed and moved from 
storage into the W-65 Bay 2 facility. The first LMP-103S full propellant TC was placed directly next to a clean, 
empty and identical TC, as pictured in figure 6b, containing a dip tube and filter cap assembly. Using previously 
rehearsed coordination, the full propellant TC was opened, cap removed and then dip tube and filter cap assembly 
from the empty TC container, positioned into the full propellant TC, and secured. The propellant TC was open 
roughly 10 seconds and no propellant vapor was detected using an ammonia gas detector. The propellant pump 
tubing outlet was placed in a 2.64 gal (10 L) waste container and the pump tubing primed. A small amount of LMP-
103S propellant was expelled into the waste container. Directly following the pump tubing propellant priming, the 
pump transfer tubing was connected to the TT propellant fill inlet. The peristaltic pump was then started, beginning 
the propellant flow from the full propellant TC to the TT. A small leak was observed at the TT propellant inlet 
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connection and the transfer was stopped. DI water wetted wipes were used to clean up the propellant. Once 
complete, the wipes were placed in a solid waste bucket. The cleanup took approximately 5 minutes. The leak path 
was corrected and the propellant transfer operation proceeded with no concern from Range Safety. The first 
pumping operation transferred 13.2 lb (6.0 kg) of LMP-103S into the TT. The propellant transfer pump tubing was 
then emptied by reversing the pumping direction in order to push the residual propellant back into its TC. The pump 
back process required only the small volume propellant removal remaining in the tube; however, the pump was 
operated longer than necessary and the eventual airflow into the TC stirred the propellant causing vapor to exhaust 
through the filter in the TC cap. This vapor detection was instantaneous and dissipated rapidly throughout the large 
46,410 ft3 (1,314 m3) Bay 2 facility. Upon vapor detection, the pump was immediately stopped and a brief 
discussion was held between the GPLD operators and Range safety. A TC cap filter inlet/outlet exhaust line was 
installed in order to move any stirred up propellant vapors away from personnel to vent to the outside atmosphere. 
This variance took roughly 10 minutes to discuss, write the procedural redlines and install the exhaust line. The 
second propellant transfer operation proceeded with no concern from Range Safety. 
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Figure 13: Transfer Tank (TT) Loading  
Using the same method as before, the dip tube and filter cap assembly was connected to the second LMP-103S 
full propellant TC. The propellant pump tubing was primed and then connected to the TT propellant fill inlet. The 
peristaltic pump was then started, beginning the propellant flow from the propellant full TC to the TT. The second 
pumping operation transferred 4.9 lb (2.2 kg) of LMP-103S into the TT. The propellant transfer pump tubing was 
then emptied by reversing the pumping direction in order to push the residual propellant back into its TC. No 
propellant vapor was detected during the second pump back operation. The TC cap removal and replacement was 
performed a final time to place the dip tube and filter cap assembly into an Isopropyl Alcohol (IPA) / De-Ionized 
(DI) water cleaning mixture. The cleaning solution was pumped through the pump transfer tubing into the waste 
container for decontamination. The fully drained and partially drained LMP-103S propellant TCs were removed 
from the area and placed back in storage. The propellant transfer GPLE was disassembled, removed from the work 
area and stored. 
The FDT and GPLE supply lines were evacuated directly ahead of propellant loading. The FDT was evacuated 
in both pressurant and propellant volumes. The mass of LMP-103S propellant loaded into the FDT was 17.2 lb 
(7.80 kg). The FC low pressure circuit was utilized to pressure-feed and move propellant from a TT into the FDT. 
The propellant flow rate was maintained at ≤ 1.1 lb/min (0.5 kg/min) for the gross filling and ≤ 0.44 lb/min 
(0.2 kg/min) for the fine filling rate closing in on the nominal target mass. The mass flow rate was tracked by 
monitoring mass decrease via the TTA scale digital display and time via stopwatch. This operation was straight 
forward, accomplished without issues, and transferred the accurate propellant mass to within tolerance. Using the 
FC vacuum circuit to bring the TT below atmosphere, the propellant was purged back away from the FDV valve. 
The FDT tank pressurant volume was then pressurized to MOP 350 psia (24.1 bar) and FVV isolated from the FC. A 
short hold period was conducted for temperature stabilization to see if the FDT MOP would fall below the nominal 
range. FDT pressurant top off was not required and the final pre-expulsion safety and instrument checkout was 
performed verifying all gauges and measurements were nominal. The FDT was now loaded 17.2 lb (7.80 kg) of 
LMP-103S, pressurized to 350 psia (24.1 bar) and instrumentation fully configured for the expulsion efficiency test. 
The EPV-2 valve was opened partially and the VI measurement data recording started.  
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The expulsion efficiency test was conducted by commanding the EPV-1 latch valve to the open position. 
Immediately, propellant began to flow out of the FDT and into the CC. The FDT scale and the load cells were used 
to establish the expulsion efficiency, both indicating ~ 99.9 % positive expulsion. The germane FDT expulsion 
measurement data is shown in Figure 14, below. As stated earlier in the instrumentation section, the load cell signal 
was extremely noisy, however the overall load cell method trended correctly with the pressure blow-down. Also of 
note is the FDT diaphragm pressure differential over the expulsion test.  
 
 
Figure 14: FDT Expulsion  
 
After the successful expulsion operation was performed, the FDT pressurant volume was at ~ 120 psia (8.3 bar). The 
FDT residual GHe was vented through the gas manifold FVV valve into the BB-1 valve and exhausted through the 
FDT propellant valve manifold, then through the EPV-2 into the CC and out the vent line to the atmosphere. During 
the course of the FDT vent operation, the dry GHe gas evaporated the LMP-103S propellant solvents leaving behind 
ADN crystals. This detail led to a slightly more complex decontamination effort than originally planned. The EPV-2 
metering valve flow area was clogged and removal of this valve became necessary. It was detached from the CC and 
flushed with water and the waste collected in the aforementioned 2.64 gal (10 L) waste container. The CC was then 
moved to outside the Bay 2 facility and the FDT propellant outflow flex line was re-attached to the CC. Even with 
the EPV-2 valve removal and restriction opened, the FDT was not fully vented, with a small residual pressure 
remaining. During the FDT vent down and GPLE purging steps, the propellant solvents had been removed leaving 
residual crystals. With this fact now apparent, the team moved into the GPLE decontamination efforts.  
 
2. Decontamination Operations  
System decontamination after flowing propellant is important for both personnel and equipment safety. The low 
toxicity LMP-103S propellant demonstrated handling benefits throughout the GPLD; however, due to the nature of 
the propellant being a salt solution, if handled improperly, ADN crystals will remain when the bulk fluid evaporates. 
To test system cleanliness, DI water was flushed through the system and a sample tested for conductivity. A 
conductivity measurement <5 μS/cm indicates that the component is clean and propellant residuals have been 
properly removed. The decontamination procedure was based on flushing the system with a cleaning solution (75% 
DI water and 25% Isopropyl Alcohol (IPA)) two to three times followed by two to three flushes of pure DI water. A 
DI water/IPA mixture was utilized due to the hydrophobic filtration at the TC propellant outflow tube. If different 
filters are used, then only pure DI water is required. Both the transfer tank and propellant tank, as well as their 
associated lines, would be cleaned using this method. When filled with the cleaning solution or water, the tanks 
would be swished around to ensure all surfaces would receive treatment. For the TT, this process involved lifting, 
tilting back and forth, the FDT was rocked using the turnover dolly. These rinses were all preceded by purging the 
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system using gas to clear bulk propellant. Further, the metal diaphragm on the FDT would be blown backward 
slightly to allow fluid to work itself into the liquid side of the tank. It was not fully determined at what pressure the 
diaphragm would pop back, or if it would break, but the risks and unknowns were deemed acceptable by both the 
loading team and the tank manufacturer to allow the team to clean the tank. 
The procedure was initiated while already in an anomalous configuration due to the residual pressure remaining 
from the gas purge at the end of the expulsion operation. Steps were taken to examine several key valves in the 
system and it was noticed that crystals had formed at several points. These crystals were choking the flow and 
causing the aforementioned behavior. A simple water rinse was sufficient to clear the crystals. Through further 
investigation it was discovered that crystals had also formed on the valves at the gas port of the tank. It was clear 
that extra steps and deviations would need to be taken to work around the unexpected buildup throughout the 
system. After the first set of blockages were cleared, the diaphragm was popped backward. Diaphragm movement 
occurred at a much lower pressure than anticipated and it would appear from the data below that the diaphragm 
potentially ruptured during this operation, as indicated by the equalization of transducers PT-1 and PT-3 after the 
initial event as shown in Figure 15 below.  
 
 
Figure 15: FDT Diaphragm Pop Back  
After crystals were found in the gaseous and high pressure section it clearly became necessary to flush DI water 
through every part of the system. A plan was written in short order with input from the GSFC Loading Team, GSFC 
Safety, WFF Safety, and ECAPS which encompassed breaking configuration several times and utilizing the rotating 
nature of the tank dolly to invert the tank and pump cleaning solution and DI water into the gas portion. The first 
sample in nearly every section tested was orders of magnitude too contaminated to be considered clean, but within a 
few rinses each section was cleared of propellant or ADN residue. With other more hazardous propellants this 
operational deviation would have taken several hours to formulate, approve, and execute. Extra time would also be 
necessary for mandatory shift switches, maximum day lengths, and any incidentals that might arise during the 
operation. In contrast, the GPLD decontamination operation was completed within 8 hours including the system 
cleaning, break down, and storage for transport back to GSFC. 
The crystal formation itself was determined to be a result of the lengthy (~15-20 minutes) FDT vent down and gas 
purges run at the end of tank expulsion and the initial steps of the decontamination procedure. Having recently come 
off a hydrazine loading operation, and also due to standard practices with other fluids, the team was conditioned to 
performing gas purges after flows to ensure bulk liquid was pushed toward waste processing containers. With LMP-
103S propellant, however, this serves to accelerate evaporation process forming crystals that choke the outlet of 
small valve sections. Had the team initially flushed with DI water and followed that with a gaseous purge it is highly 
likely that this situation would not have occurred. Despite the relative ease of cleanup, it is highly advised that a 
liquid cleaning agent be used immediately after flowing propellant to prevent ADN salt residue buildup. 
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IV. Range Safety  
As part of the demonstration work, GSFC and WFF documented Range safety analyses and practices including 
all elements of shipping, storage, handling, operations, decontamination, and disposal. LMP-103S has not been 
previously handled at a U.S. Launch Range and requisite for this activity was a GPLD Risk Analysis Report (RAR), 
and the Ground Safety Plan (GSP). GSFC and WFF Safety offices jointly developed the safety documentation for 
application into the operation. The analyses defined the required PPE, handling facility, propellant monitors and 
controls, as well as the safety support personnel required during loading.  
The GPLD required personnel are outlined in Table 2 and was divided into three operational categories. Nominal 
operations included the pressure integrity testing and propellant loading into the FDT using a leak tested closed 
system. Critical operations comprised the TC open container operations and in the event of a large spill response, 
designated the personnel required. The pressurization operations included the FDT MOP pressurization and FDT 
expulsion. These operational groupings, agreed to in procedures and the GSP, were relaxed as the GPLD operational 
week proceeded and Range safety developed greater comfort for both the LMP-103S propellant and the GPLD 
operation. The Range safety GPLD program manager allowed ECAPS and Moog Inc. personnel into Bay 2 facility 
for the FDT expulsion and subsequent decontamination, for example. 
The GPLD operation demonstrated that Self Contained Atmospheric Protective Ensemble (SCAPE) was 
unnecessary and not required by Range Safety to process the LMP-103S propellant. In addition, a dedicated control 
room separating the procedural instructor and propellant loading operators was extraneous and not utilized. After 
monitoring insignificant ammonia concentration well below the operator 8 hour exposure limit during the first TC 
open container operation, the use of filter cartridge respiratory protection was ruled dispensable by Range Safety. 
During the second TC LMP-103S open container operation, all decontamination, and GPLE connection disassembly 
was performed without respiratory protection, while still employing ammonia vapor monitoring.  
 
Table 2: GPLD Operations Required Personnel 
Organization
Critical / Essential 
Personnel
Operation Job Responsibility
NASA-GSFC
GPLD Operations 
Coordinator
(LOC)
Nominal
Critical
Pressurization
Lead Propulsion Engineer running the procedure and 
directing the overall operation.
Instrumentation Operator
(DAQ)
Nominal
Pressurization
Propulsion Engineer primarily responsible for monitoring 
and recording through LabVIEW FDT temperatures, 
pressures and load cell output on the DIAB. Also in charge of 
Latching Isolation Valve (EPV-1) actuation 
Fueling Cart (FC) 
Operator
(TECH-1) 
Nominal
Pressurization
Propulsion Technician primarily responsible for operating 
the FC.  
Transfer Tank / 
Peristaltic Pump 
Operator
(TECH-2)
Nominal
Critical
Pressurization
Propulsion Technician primarily responsible for operating 
the TTA and FDT valves, and peristaltic pump operator for 
propellant transfer. Also, on stand-by to fill in and help out 
as necessary if required
GSFC Safety 
Representative
(Safety)
Nominal
Pressurization
Monitors the operation to ensure safety of the personnel and 
the hardware.
NASA -WFF
WFF Safety
(OSS)
Nominal
Critical
Pressurization
NASA WFF safety specialist who will monitor the GPLD 
operation to ensure the safety of the facility.
ECAPS
ECAPS Personnel Nominal
LMP-103S Handling and Fueling Specialist
ECAPS Personnel  Nominal
Moog Inc.
Moog FDT 
subject matter expert 
Nominal Moog personnel Flight Development Tank (FDT) expert  
 
A. Risk Analysis Report and Ground Safety Plan  
The RAR prepared by GSFC and WFF Range safety captured technical information required for GPLD system 
safety verification and certification. This document identified GPLD associated risks, comparing the risk potential 
versus control techniques to evaluate the feasibility of safely conducting this demonstration. The risk analysis was 
performed in accordance with WFF Range safety process guideline 800-PG-8715.5.115. The RAR investigated all 
aspects of the loading equipment, procedures, and operational methods. Risks associated with the FDT, GPLE, 
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inadvertent release of propellant from either, explosives, high pressure, and chemical systems were the major safety 
topics evaluated. From these areas, specific safety engineering analyses were performed, including the propellant 
tank danger area based on tank MEOP, propellant vapor composition analysis, anticipated propellant vapor exposure 
for open container operations, anticipated exposure for catastrophic release, exclusion zones, control area definition, 
and an electrical hardware overview.  
The identified risks were categorized into the handling of the LMP-103S propellant and explosive material, 
propellant spills or leaks during the operation leading to personnel exposure or propellant volatile evaporation, 
flammability concerns due to the LMP-103S methanol and ammonia constituents, and FDT catastrophic failure. The 
probability and severity of occurrence was evaluated and Range Safety controls were established and documented in 
the GSP in order to make the Range operation permissible. Since this was the foundational Range handling 
operation, a conservative safety approach was taken in the risk evaluation and control.  
Based on the RAR, the GSP outlined the GPLD operator and Range safety responsibilities in the implementation 
of the loading operation. The GPLD test director, WFF program manager, and Range safety specialist shared 
accountabilities for safe GPLD performance. The GSP outlined the GPLD operator training requirements, which 
required each to have 1) Explosive Handler Certification, 2) Pressure Operator Certification, 3) Respirator 
Certification and 4) the competition of the 1-day, LMP-103S safety briefing. The chemical systems were described 
and emergency, first-aid and firefighting procedures for LMP-103S propellant were acknowledged.  
For this operation, the LMP-103S flashpoint temperature was unknown and, without this information, the 
propellant vapor was considered flammable due the methanol and ammonia concentration. LMP-103S flammability 
experiments have been performed at Eurenco Bofors in Sweden, and by the Finnish Defence Research Agency as 
part of the LMP-103S propellant European Conformity (CE) certification. In each of these tests, it was shown that it 
was not possible to ignite pure LMP-103S. However, the industry standard test method for closed cup flash point 
determination, had not been performed and, as such, the propellant vapor was designated flammable for this 
exercise.  
In order to determine the potential for a flammable vapor condition to exist, a RAR assessment was completed 
based on the LMP-103S methanol’s constituent. Methanol was also chosen for evaluation due to its lower explosive 
limit as opposed to ammonia. Based on the propellant liquid operational usage in the closed and pressurized system, 
the area surrounding the test setup was designated a Class I Division II environment, defined as an area where 
ignitable concentrations of flammable gas, vapor, or liquid are not likely to exist under normal operating conditions, 
but may accidentally exist. The control area was based on each potential leak source and from each, the appropriate 
exclusion zone defined. Although not an explosive material such as LMP-103S, IPA is a flammable liquid with 
roughly the same flashpoint temperature of methanol and additionally, IPA exhibits a lower explosive limit. During 
the GPLE propellant decontamination, 2.5 gal (9.5 L) of pure IPA was mixed with DI water to prepare the cleaning 
fluid. The IPA flammability risk was not controlled as rigorously as LMP-103S, representing an interesting 
dichotomy between the utility of commonly used chemicals with known flammability risks and the risks of a less 
familiar potentially flammable material.  
There were initial concerns regarding the use of electronics in the loading hall due to the potential for a 
flammable atmosphere. Limited types of electrical equipment may be utilized in a Class I Division II environment. 
Each piece of electrical equipment proposed for use in the control area was evaluated by GSFC and WFF safety to 
certify that the device was properly rated for use. Some devices were properly rated, or intrinsically safe, for use in 
the control area, while others were evaluated to demonstrate insufficient energy to act as an ignition source. A few 
were situational use, meaning the device contained sufficient energy to act as an ignition source. In the operation of 
each case the environment was verified as non-flammable using a propellant vapor detection monitor before 
operation.  
Propellant vapor dispersion calculations, power density calculations, and the use of proper equipment placement 
combined to satisfy all involved parties and allow the use of the electrical devices, power supplies, and DAQ system 
during operations as opposed to enforcing a full explosion-proof system. The methanol dispersion calculations 
indicated that outside of a prescribed radius the vast majority of methanol would sit no higher than three feet above 
the ground. This dispersion calculation assumed 2.64 gal (10 L) of LMP-103S was released and the methanol was 
released at a rate of 46.3 grams/min. It is important to note that for GPLD, at any one time, the most propellant in 
the system was 1.75 gal (6.7 L). In order to release the full 2.64 gal (10 L), multiple failures and personnel 
mishandlings would need to have occurred simultaneously. By placing all electronics and power supplies on a table 
higher than three feet, this condition was met. The load cells and pressure transducers power consumption was low 
enough, and the devices far enough away from each other and the greatest flammable atmosphere potential, the TT, 
that power density calculations showed no reasonable risk of igniting the methanol vapor.  
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To protect GPLD personnel from the ammonia and methanol propellant vapor, two types of respirators were 
designated - Powered Air Purifying Respirators (PAPR) and supplied air. At no point in the GPLD operation was 
supplied air used and was only planned for in the event of a catastrophic anomaly involving the full release of 
propellant. For this risk assessment, the basis was that the full 2.64 gal (10 L) of LMP-103S was assumed released 
and the methanol and ammonia immediately came out of solution. Without propellant vapor composition analysis 
data, the worst case approach was applied to the GPLD operation. The respiratory protection approach was created 
by both GSFC and WFF safety and agreed upon by the GSFC industrial health group. During operations, personnel 
monitored the actual ammonia concentrations using ammonia gas detectors. This, in concert with the RAR 
propellant vapor exposure analysis, produced a situational respirator protection protocol. For nominal operations the 
propellant was fully enclosed in the system with no leaks or release of propellant and no respiratory protection was 
required. During the first open container operation, PAPR protection was worn and the ammonia concentration level 
was monitored. Since it was observed that the ammonia concentration was consistently below the defined ammonia 
concentration action point, personnel were allowed to forgo the use of respirator protection. This was contingent on 
continued monitoring to determine if respiratory protection would resume. The respirator protection plan defined 
ammonia concentration action points for the opening of wetted lines and leaks. At the point in the procedure 
necessary to open potentially wetted lines, Range safety deemed it permissible to only monitor the ammonia 
concentrations and to evaluate the respirator protection needs based on measurement data.  
B. Personnel Protective Equipment  
GPLD personnel were required to wear chemical resistant gloves, splash resistant clean room suits, and safety 
glasses as shown in Figure 16. The gloves were made from a polychoroprene material and the clean room suits were 
chosen to meet the GSFC cleanroom certifications for future LMP-103S loading efforts. ESD (Electric Static 
Discharge) wrist straps were required during the open container operations and, additionally, any time a connection 
was opened where undiluted, residual propellant was expected. LMP-103S is not ESD sensitive, however due to its 
explosive characteristics, the WFF Range explosive safety officer required GPLD personnel to wear ESD protection 
as an explosive handling best practice. Proper respiratory protection was required for the TC open container 
operation, but as mentioned and pictured in Figure 16a, respirators were not required for the second TC open 
container operation. Figure 16b shows the GPLD team in process of FDT loading. For decontamination, only lab 
coats, gloves, and safety glasses were required.  
 
 
Figure 16: a) TC Open Container Operation    b) GPLD personnel loading the FDT 
V. GPLD Cost Comparison 
Table 3 presents a resource comparison between spacecraft processing hydrazine and LMP-103S propellant. In 
order to detail quantitative savings and the benefits related to handling LMP-103S, items associated with propellant 
loading were investigated, specific to the methods employed by GSFC in loading GPM and MMS. The labor and 
other direct costs are normalized with the hydrazine effort set to a value of “1” as the known reference, and the 
LMP-103S processing shown as either a percent reduction or increase. The known reference magnitude is not 
offered in the table and varies substantially depending on the item. A draft hydrazine and HPGP loading and 
decontamination schedule was created, taking into consideration the previous GSFC hydrazine loadings and the 
GPLD operation. For hydrazine, the four hour SCAPE operator limit, personnel and required shift changeover, 
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control room operational personnel, and fire watch shifts were considered and built into the schedule. In addition, 
after a hydrazine load two propulsion personnel are at the launch site, continuously, from load to launch representing 
the marching army. A moderate two week period was considered for this comparison, but could be less or even 
greater depending on the specific mission, encapsulation, and launch slips, etc. A propellant sampling operation was 
assumed for each, as this is a GSFC spacecraft propellant loading requirement. LMP-103S propellant sampling is a 
topic area in the European Space Agency (ESA) LMP-103S monopropellant space qualification16. Since the 
sampling method is not finalized, a conservative value was estimated for LMP-103S propellant sampling due to the 
unknowns. However, the sampling was assumed to be greater for a hydrazine.  
A final decontamination schedule was prepared for the hydrazine comparison, as this operation for both GPM 
and MMS, was performed after loading when the spacecraft had been moved out from the loading facility. The 
HPGP FC and GPLE decontamination operation was included into the loading week schedule effort; essentially the 
last day of the operation. For both the GPM and MMS loading operation, multiple hypergol trainings were required 
and these costs were carried forward into this assessment. GSFC propulsion has a hydrazine loading cart and 
available equipment for use in a hypergol loading. For a LMP-103S loading effort, a loading cart similar to the 
ECAPS FC would need to be manufactured. GSFC propulsion has the necessary functions in multiple pieces of 
equipment, however, for simplicity combining all loading functions into one single piece of equipment is greatly 
beneficial. One of the major potential sources of LMP-103S process savings is from the reduction in propellant 
handling facilities. For GPLD, the operation was conducted in an explosive rated high-bay. All propellant vapor was 
vented directly to the atmosphere, not into a scrubber as with hydrazine processing. The W-65 Bay 2 facility also 
contained no air exchange or turnover functions. These items, and the potential further reductions, could prove even 
more substantial, representing greater savings. This assessment covers the propulsion loading effort only and not the 
propellant cost or any additional HPGP prolusion system drivers. In all, GPLD proved a ~ 72% resource reduction 
in contrast to an equivalent hydrazine loading effort. The GPLD quantitative comparison information compares 
quite favorably with the reductions realized in the PRISMA loading campaign.   
Table 3: Hydrazine versus HPGP Processing – Quantitative Comparison 
Hydrazine HPGP (LMP-103S)
Basis of Estimate
Labor Cost Cost  Labor Cost Cost 
Loading 1 --- 0.701 --- Based on DRAFT Schedule – GPM  – MMS – GPLD 
Decontamination 1 --- Included in Load Hours Based on DRAFT Schedule – GPM  – MMS  – GPLD 
Fire Watch 1 --- Not Required Based on DRAFT Schedule – GPM  – MMS  – GPLD 
Marching Army 1 --- Not Required Assuming 2 weeks – Propellant Load to Launch
Physicals 1 --- 0.125 --- SCAPE Comprehensive Physical vs Ordnance Handler
Training 1 1 0.125 --- WSTF TES, KSC SCAPE, Hypergol systems 
Sampling 1 0.5 SCAPE – KSC 
Drain Container Processing 1 0.3 KSC – GPM  – MMS  – GPLD 
SCAPE Rental and Support 
(PPE) 
1 0.15
Based on DRAFT Schedule – GPM  – MMS  – GPLD 
HPGP – SCAPE not required
Load Cart Final 
Decontamination 
1 Not Required Based on DRAFT Schedule –GPM  – MMS  – GPLD 
Procedures 1 0.5 MMS – GPM – GPLD 
GSE 1 2 GPM  – MMS – Green Load Cart Build 
Travel 1 Not Required WSTF/KSC Training for SCAPE Certification 
Facilities TBD TBD Buried costs that could prove substantial 
Hydrazine 1 HPGP 0.28 ~ 73% overall total cost reduction for HPGP 
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VI. Accomplishments  
GPLD was the inaugural domestic LMP-103S loading operation, demonstrating transport, storage, and handling 
of the propellant at a U.S. Range. The team successfully developed GPLE flight passivation and cleaning processes. 
Moreover, the loading and decontamination procedures approved by GSFC and WFF Safety for GPLD can be 
leveraged in the future. The NASA GSFC team was able to show a clear reduction in effort with HPGP versus 
hydrazine loading through quantitative assessment. Through the demonstration, NASA GSFC gained practical 
experience in LMP-103S handling. As with most loading operations, small leaks are always a possibility. With the 
demonstration, the GPLD team was able to perform a small propellant leak clean-up and ADN salt decontamination 
without major or even minor safety concerns, complications, or violations.  
The GPLD was a tremendously successful collaboration of NASA, SNSB, ECAPS, and Moog, Inc. Through this 
effort, LMP-103S propellant has achieved a U.S. Range acceptance, as well as a Range and Pressure PVS FC 
equipment certification. The Moog Inc. titanium rolling diaphragm tank was tested for expulsion efficiency with 
propellant as opposed to a water simulant. Through this effort, the tank development effort, and AIAA-S-080 
qualification process, it is now scheduled to fly on Sierra Nevada Corporation’s SN-50 Nanosat. Through GPLD, 
WFF was the first U.S. Range to accept the propellant, developing Range analysis documents required for future 
missions.  
VII. HPGP Risk Reduction and Future Efforts  
As science missions move forward with potential infusion of green propellants, a number of questions remain 
open which must be addressed. One of the most significant outcomes of the GPLD safety planning meetings and 
operation was the identification of additional LMP-103S chemical property data necessary to process LMP-103S 
propellant in the most effective way and deliver the greatest benefit to future missions. ESA has multiple programs 
in work to space qualify LMP-103S propellant. These programs are investigating propellant analysis methods, 
physical and chemical properties, vapor phase and gas absorption, propellant handling operations, additional safety 
testing, propellant production and quality assurance, and propellant toxicity. In addition, GSFC is working with 
WSTF to perform LMP-103S closed and open cup flashpoint and propellant vapor phase composition 
measurements. The current Safety Data Sheet (SDS) associated with LMP-103S was last published in 2012. Since 
that time, a number of additional tests and experiments have been performed to further prove the inherent safety of 
LMP-103S propellant. Updating the SDS to reflect the most current test data and information will aide in the 
potential for the relaxation of conservative safety controls. 
In addition to the Range-specific analysis identified, there are a number of propulsion system performance 
questions. Such as how do off the shelf propulsion components perform with this novel propellant, how does the 
fluid behave in terms of flow rates and surge pressures, and do valves operate differently. The historical data 
available from the PRISMA and Terra Bella SkySat propulsion system components must be leveraged and expanded 
upon going forward. Additional material compatibility work must be done to increase the knowledge of propellant 
compatibility with a variety of off the shelf fluid system components and materials. Additional flow testing and 
system priming testing is planned for 2017 to further gain system flow performance data using propulsion system 
components and LMP-103S propellant. Thruster qualification life testing is additionally required to design and 
effectively utilize HPGP systems for NASA missions. HPGP total system trades have been conducted for two 
current early phase GSFC missions: Plankton, Aerosols, Clouds, and ocean Ecosystems (PACE) and Wide Field 
Infrared Survey Telescope (WFIRST). Each gains benefit from this propellant through increased performance and 
the handling benefits proven through GPLD. HPGP technology is being considered for these missions due to the 1-
lbf (5 N) and 5-lbf (22 N) thruster maturity and the 2017 planned life testing to demonstrate the increased 
throughput mandatory meet these mission requirements. In upcoming years, ECAPS, ESA, and NASA are all 
working to perform tests that address any gaps in system performance moving LMP-103S technologies toward 
mission infusion. 
VIII. Conclusions  
The institutional knowledge and practical hands-on experience gained from this pathfinder activity can be taken 
and directly applied to future NASA mission LMP-103S propellant flight loading scenarios. The GPLD operation 
demonstrated a significant reduction in effort over a hydrazine equivalent loading providing quantifiable evidence of 
cost and schedule savings. This evidence has been documented, communicated, and presented to both the PACE and 
WFIRST missions as part of the green propulsion trades, proving the GPLD operational impact. Through this work, 
NASA continues to advance the experience base with LMP-103S green propellant and close the gap between 
research and eventual flight, laying the foundation for future NASA mission infusion.  
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